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The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether the presence of Hot Air trading 
jeopardizes the environmental target of an international environmental agree-
ment. We argue that Hot Air can be used as an implicit side-payment mecha-
nism to actually bring about higher environmental protection compared to the 
situation without the trade option. We point to the existence of a fundamental 
trade-off between costs of compliance and the creation of dynamic incentives to 
develop cheaper reduction technologies. Implicit side-payments, in terms of 
Hot Air provision, may be needed in order to establish a compromise between 
these opposing demands. We identify the shortcomings and benefits of allowing 
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Did the presence of Hot Air jeopardize the Kyoto agreement, or did the resis-
tance against cheap reduction opportunities? And what are the long run implica-
tions of different methods of complying with environmental targets in the short 
run? 
 
This paper sets out to clarify the effects of including Hot Air into a tradable 
permit system. It will be argued that the presence of Hot Air actually can in-
crease environmental protection in the long run, since it might overcome the 
main obstacle for progress in the reduction of international environmental prob-
lems, that being the high costs of emissions reduction. We will discuss the op-
tion of using Hot Air as an implicit side-payment mechanism that may actually 
bring about higher environmental protection compared to the situation without 
this trade option. The insight gained from this analysis will be applied to study 
the Climate change negotiations with special focus on the risk of making an 
agreement unnecessarily costly. 
 
In the beginning of the 1970s, the growing concern regarding the increased 
transboundary character of environmental problems lead to the formulation of 
the first guidelines to help alleviate these problems. The necessity of common 
responsibility to control transboundary pollution was formulated at the UN con-
ference in 1972 in Stockholm: ”States have in accordance with the charter of 
the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right 
to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, 
and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or con-
trol do not cause damages to the environment of other states or of areas beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction”.
1 With this declaration the international soci-
ety accepted the application of the polluters pay principle. But there is a long 
distance between this acceptance and the political reality: The problem is that 
this principle is in opposition to both the political structure of the international 
society and the prevailing economic incentives. 
 
The political structure is defined by the absence of a supranational authority 
empowered to enforce legislation upon states. The sovereignty of nations im-
                                                           
1  In: Principle 21 in ”The Declaration of the Human Environment” accepted by the OECD 
countries at the UN conference in 1972 in Stockholm. 
 
7plies that any contribution to alleviate an international environmental problem 
must be on a voluntary basis.
2 Varming et al. (2000) note that achieving a fully 
co-coordinated global solution to the problem of climate change is going to be 
difficult because no global institution is in place for enforcing the agreement. 
Thus, because cost-sharing and the control system are not strictly enforced by 
one global authority, the collective good provision of CO2 reduction may not 
take place even though it pays for the group as a whole (see logic of collective 
action analysis in Svendsen, 2003). 
 
As a consequence, questions about design of an agreement must inevitably con-
centrate on finding the right conditions, such that all (or at least the most impor-
tant) countries have an incentive to join the agreement.
3 This is particularly 
relevant in situations when the intrinsic prisoner’s dilemma structure cannot be 
altered. Here the only way to encourage countries to participate is to find a 
compromise that in the best possible way takes into account the individual 
countries’ conditions. 
 
A minimum requirement for participation is that each participant perceives a 
net gain from entering the agreement. An important observation of international 
environmental agreements is that because participation in such agreements must 
be totally voluntarily and a country should never be expected to sign an agree-
ment that makes it worse off compared to no agreement. Given this hypothesis, 
without a net gain, there will be no agreement. Hence, if a country does not 
achieve an overall net gain from an agreement, one would expect an unstable 
agreement that is not likely to succeed in the longer run. This view is supported 
by Barrett (1998a), Bohm (1999) and Sandler (1997). 
 
One compromise could be to use side payments to encourage participation. 
Such arrangements, based on a (partially) victims’ pays principle are seldom 
seen: Mäler (1993, p27) mentions that: ”it is somewhat surprising that instances 
where international environmental problems have been solved with the aid of 
                                                           
co-
).  
2  “Standard solutions for transboundary environmental externalities are therefore not available, 
and the protection of the international commons is left to voluntary agreements among sover-
eign countries. It is precisely this fact, which requires a shift in our analysis, from a literature 
on government intervention to a literature between nations and international policy govern-
ment”. Carraro and Siniscalco, 1992, p. 380. 
3  Stavin mentions that climate agreements have to be founded on ”sound science, rational e
nomics, and pragmatic politics”. (R.N. Stavin: Briefing for H.E. Kofi Annan, 24 April 2002
 
8side payments are very rare”. He states three main reasons, first it stands against 
policy recommendations (the polluter pays principal). Moreover, the paying 
countries might be labeled weak negotiators, and side payments might create 
expectations of precedence. Last, as with subsidies, it has a risk of creating the 
wrong set of incentives. 
 
Although it would seem that side payments are not politically feasible, their 
relevance in order to promote cooperation cannot be ignored, especially when 
countries differ greatly with respect to net gain or national income. This will be 
the point of departure of our paper: There might be good reason to search for 
less visible ways of payment to ”bribe” countries to participate in an agreement. 
The presence of Hot Air can be seen as such an instrument: Nentjes and Wo-
erdman (2000) and Woerdman (2001) argue that the Kyoto figures were negoti-
ated on the prospect (at least from the side of the US and Russia) of the avail-
ability of free trade. Thus, the presence of Hot Air cannot be seen independ-
ently of the negotiated target levels in Kyoto.
4 
 
At the risk of losing some realism but at the same time gaining simplicity and 
predictive power, we assume that negotiators are fully informed and economi-
cally rational decision-makers with the best economic interest of their countries 
at heart at all times.
5 
 
Section 2 examines the implication of Hot Air in the short run and the long run. 
Section 3 examines the Kyoto agreement and the section 4 looks at the presence 
of Hot Air in the climate change issue. Section 5 is concerned with the dynamic 
perspectives given various scenarios about the short run achievements in the 
climate change issue. These analyses lead to a concluding policy recommenda-




                                                           
4  Woerdman (2001, page 9): “Eastern Europeans seem to consider the tradable Hot Air as a le-
gitimate compensation for the emissions reductions induced by the economic decline which re-
sulted from the deliberately established economic transition process”. 
5  When the decision makers are not full informed, one should be even more cautious with too 
high reduction demands. One reason for this is that industrial groups might point to the highest 
cost estimates and put more pressure on a government for a weakening of environmental tar-
gets, especially if the industrial groups have superior information about the true reduction costs. 
 
92.  Implications of Hot Air 
Hot Air is generated in situations where, even without any policy action, emis-
sions are likely to be significantly below target levels. In conjunction with an 
international permit trading system, the increased “free permits” (permits that 
are not a result of emissions reduction effort), can be sold as Hot Air to other 
participating countries and used to offset their GHG emissions. In the Kyoto 
protocol, for example, Russia’s actual emission level is lower than the number 
of grandfathered permits and in connection with a tradable permits system, Hot 
Air is created. ”Grandfathering” simply means that the property right to emis-
sion rights is freely transferred on the basis of certain distribution rules (Tieten-
berg, 1995). 
2.1. An example of Hot Air 
We provide a very simple example that shows why the presence of Hot Air 
does not jeopardize the agreed upon overall emission target of an international 
environmental agreement. Let there be a uniformly mixed pollution emitted in 
two countries, A and B. Country A has an emission of 100 units and agrees to 
reduce by 10%, in year X. Country B also has an emission of 100 units and 
agrees to reduce by 10%, in year X. The new agreed upon total emission is 180, 
which defines the environmental target of the agreement. Now, due to an eco-
nomic recession in country B, even without any abatement effort, in the year X 
this country will only have an emission of 85. Thus, if country A meets it’s 
agreed upon reduction, the actual emission in year X is 175. 
 
If we allow the countries to trade emission rights freely, such that each country 
is given 90 emission units, the first 5 units of country B are provided ”at zero 
costs”  and will be bought by country A. (This amount is, for obvious reasons, 
called Hot Air). This increases emission units in country B by 5, without chang-
ing the actual emission in country A. If more trade prevails, this will not change 
the total emission. In a free-trade situation, the emission level will be 180, 
which is exactly the agreed upon environmental target. 
 
The effects of Hot Air in this example: 
 





                                                          
Marginal costs of country A have been lowered considerably 
The 10 units of Hot Air have reduced total compliance costs of country A 
considerably 
Country B has received a large payment 
 
Now, since country B has experienced a large recession, it might be reasonable 
to expect that it is not likely to undertake costly abatement efforts.
6 Hence, 
without the presence of Hot Air, it will not sign the agreement, and there will be 
no agreement, leaving the emissions at 185. Hot Air has been a mechanism of 
implicit side payments, and has secured the originally stipulated environmental 
target. 
 
This is the heart of our arguments. Once signed, agreements are more likely to 
be kept with Hot Air.
7 Hot Air might actually increase the total amount of envi-
ronmental quality (emissions reduction) that an agreement can sustain. 
2.2. How Hot Air affects permit price? 
One of the objections against the use of Hot Air is that it reduces the incentives 
to support non-renewable energy supply systems and reduces the incentives to 
develop new and less polluting energy supply system. The demand curve for 
permits can be defined as a country’s willingness to pay in order to avoid an-
other unit of reduction (which is equal to the marginal abatement cost). The 
supply curve, measuring the cost of providing another permit, is simply the 
marginal abatement cost, the opportunity costs of reduction. Therefore, the sup-
ply curve at the first unit of permits is equal to the lowest marginal cost of 
meeting the emissions reductions target, while the demand curve is the highest 
cost. Permits will be traded until the cost a buying country avoids by emitting 
one unit more is equal to the cost a selling country incurs of reducing another 
unit, which can be seen in figure 1. Since Hot Air is emission units that can be 
provided without any costly reduction effort, it can be provided at zero costs 




6  We here implicitly assume that at the time of signing the agreement, the recession is already a 
reality, while the base line emissions refer to a date before the recession. 
7  Or, because of the flexibility, targets are more likely to be signed in the first place. 
 
11Figure 1: How Hot Air affects permit prices 
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In figure 1, this is illustrated by a shift in the supply curve from S
-Hot Air to S
+Hot 
Air. The effect is that trade increases and the equilibrium price is reduced. The 
marginal costs under free trade are equal to the permit price under free trade. 
The reason is that each country can either buy permits or reduce its emissions, 
and it will always choose the cheapest option. In this way, no country’s mar-
ginal costs will ever be above the permit price in equilibrium. It cannot be 
lower either, since then this country could make further reductions and sell with 
a gain. Hence, inclusion of Hot Air reduces the marginal costs of meeting the 
pre-defined emissions reduction targets. 
2.3. Negative effects of Hot Air 
Market-based instruments have the potential to provide powerful incentives for 
companies to adapt cheaper and better pollution-control technologies. This is 
because with market-based instruments, it always pays firms to clean up a bit 
more if a sufficiently low-cost method (technology or process) of doing so can 
be identified and adopted.
8 One main objection to the inclusion of Hot Air is 
that is lowers the incentives to develop cleaner technologies, since the higher 
the marginal reduction cost (of the last unit of reduction), the higher such incen-
tives. In a tradable permit system, such incentives are determined by the pre-
vailing permit price. From figure 1, it is obvious that Hot Air reduces the permit 
price. 
 
                                                           
8 See  Stavins  (2002). 
 
12What is the implication of including Hot Air on the relative competitiveness of 
different energy supply systems? In order to answer this question, it will prove 
informative to look at how different reduction policies to cope with the climate 
change issue influence the relative prices of various energy supply systems. 
 
The marginal costs of fossil-based energy production can be assumed to rise 
over time. For example, coal producers have to dig deeper mines or have to use 
less efficient coal. development towards the use of renewable energy sources 
may be sped up if the environmental costs are added to the price of fossil fuels, 
for example by taxing fossil fuels or by adding the permit price of CO2 emis-
sions. In this way, more stringent CO2 reduction obligations increase the rela-
tive price of non-renewable fossil fuels compared to renewable energy. Eventu-
ally, it may suddenly pay to switch to a renewable resource, for example from 
oil to wind or solar energy in power plants.
9 
 
A switch point approach can yield valuable insights into how different policy 
options influence the timing of switch points. To illustrate this point, figure 2 
shows a situation where only two possible types of energy production exist, 
coal fired and wind-based, where wind based energy production is CO2 neutral. 
Here we compare two policy options, a fully flexible situation, where no restric-
tion on international trade in permits exists, and one where only domestic emis-
sion reductions are allowed. Coal
NT identifies the price of energy produced by 
coal in a non-trade scenario, while Coal
FT is defined as the coal based energy 
price in a full trade situation. Obviously, wind-based energy production be-
comes competitive compared to coal-based energy production at a lower emis-
sions-reduction level in a non-trade situation. Inclusion of Hot Air even moves 
the switch points further to the right. 
 
                                                           
9  An in depth analysis of this can be found in Brandt and Svendsen (2003) and Grübler et al. 
(1999). 
 























2.4. Long run consequences 
Whether or not the presence of Hot Air trading reduces long run incentives for 
development and implementation of cleaner technologies remains unclear. 
Creation of dynamic incentives means that new cleaner technologies are devel-
oped. Such developments reduce abatement costs and causes further progress. 
However, such thinking stems from national regulation theory, and does not 
consider resistance from the regulated entities, or sovereignty issues in the in-
ternational community. Since countries are free to leave/not sign an agreement, 
approaches that increase the costs run the risk of reducing the number of par-
ticipating countries. 
 
Figure 3: The level of reduction costs influences long run progress 
Marginal costs Total costs 
politial acceptability




As an example, if the purpose of the Kyoto-agreement was not only to secure 
the 5.2% reduction of the Annex B countries, but also to promote incentives to 
 
14develop new abatement technologies, then the best way to achieve these two 
objectives on the basis of the cost structure is by applying an approach that si-
multaneously yields low overall costs of compliance (to secure maximum po-
litical acceptability), and high marginal abatement costs of the last reduced unit 
(to secure maximum incentives to develop new and cleaner technologies). This 
reasoning is reproduced in figure 3. 
 
Note, however, that the inclusion of Hot Air both reduces total costs and mar-
ginal costs of emissions reductions. On the other hand, restriction of Hot Air 
trading increases both marginal and total reduction costs, increasing the prob-
ability of non-ratification and “dead-lock” of further negotiations.
10 
 
It is possible to identify situations where high short run political acceptability is 
a pre-requisite for the long run incentives to be achievable. Such a situation ex-
ists in the case, where progress to reduce the international dispersed pollutant 
take place successively and where future reduction requirements are linked to 
past performances. 
 
The main reason why we come to this conclusion is that a break-down of ongo-
ing negotiations is likely to result in persistently negative consequences in the 
long run. This can be seen from the fact that a number of international envi-
ronmental agreements are built-up by successively tightening the individual and 
total reduction obligations. In efforts to control the climate change problem, the 
first negotiations in Rio in 1992 stipulated stabilization of emissions, whereas 
the Kyoto agreement stipulated a total 5.2% reduction by 2008-2012 compared 
to 1990 levels for most industrialized countries. The same successive increase 
in demands has been identified in the efforts to control the European acid rain 
problem (see Greene, 1996 and Klaassen, 1996) and to control the ozone layer 
depletion problem (Barrett, 1997). 
 
There is also evidence that future demands are linked to past performances. In 
OECD (2000) it is argued that future agreements on environmental issues will 
depend on the initial steps (”path dependency”). In the Second Sulphur Protocol 
this has been observed directly, since the individual reductions were calculated 
                                                           
10  For the EU, one of the main reasons for subsidiarity has been that “main part of reduction 
should be undertaken domestically, for the sake of developing new technologies” (Woerdman, 
2001). 
 
15on the basis of cost-efficiency, subject to the condition that countries carry out 
reductions they would have undertaken anyway (see Klaassen, 1996). Examples 
of this “path-dependency” can also be found in the climate change issue, which 
will be discussed in section 5. Note, however, as a consequence of this path-
dependency, after the withdrawal of the US from the Kyoto-agreement in 2001, 
mainly on reasons of concerns about costs, once the US enters again, it now has 
a large bargaining strength to receive low reductions relative to its original 
Kyoto-target. We will come back to the issue. 
2.5. Positive and negative consequences of Hot Air, a summery 
The positive consequences of the inclusion of Hot Air are that, it reduces the 
total cost of compliance and therefore, in the best possible way, supports the 
achievement of the stated environmental objectives, and it increases the politi-
cal acceptability, by reducing the costs of compliance. Hot Air can be used as 
an “implicit side payment arrangement”. It might be very difficult for countries 
that have experienced a large economic recession to engage in costly abatement 
actions. Since the amount of Hot Air is linked to the size of the recession, the 
larger the economic downturn, the more permits the country in question could 
sell, which in most cases would yield a higher amount of compensation for this 
country. Such compensation can be seen as the price the international commu-
nity has to pay in order to including, e.g. Russia in the Kyoto agreement.
11 
 
The main negative effect of including Hot Air in a permit trading system is that 
as long as this implies a lowering of the permit price, it reduces long run dy-
namic incentives to develop new cleaner technology. That is, the switching 
point between conventional energy production and energy production that is 
environmentally friendlier will be achieved at a later date. 
 
We are now in the position to evaluate the effect that the restrictions on the pos-
sibilities to trade have on the Kyoto agreement, but before doing so, let us in 
briefly summarize the achievements of the Kyoto protocol. 
 
                                                           
11  Nentjes and Woerdman (2000) and Woerdman (2001) argue that the Kyoto figures were nego-
tiated on the prospect (at least from the side of the US and Russia) of the availability of free 
trade. Thus, the presence of Hot Air cannot be seen independently of the negotiated target lev-
els in Kyoto. 
 
163.  The Kyoto agreement 
The Kyoto agreement was signed by 149 countries and included two main 
breakthroughs. First, a five-year commitment period (2008–2012) is defined in 
which the emissions targets for individual countries listed in ”Annex B” have to 
be reached. 38 industrialised ”Annex B countries” committed themselves to an 
emission ceiling for a group of six greenhouse gases.
12 Second, the Kyoto 
agreement allows countries to trade greenhouse gases as one of the three ”flexi-
ble mechanisms”. Emissions trading mean that trade of, for example, CO2 emis-
sion permits can take place between the 38 Annex B countries. In principle, the 
United States could in fact increase its 1990 emission of greenhouse gases if it 
buys the corresponding permits from Russia, for example. Note that the distri-
bution rule of grandfathering, which was used in the American ”Acid Rain Pro-
gram” and was suggested in the EU CO2 market, also forms the basis of the 
Kyoto Protocol. Initially, the United States strongly advocated the idea of 
global CO2 trade because of the positive experiences the United States has had 
with buying and selling environmental permits (Svendsen, 2003). 
 
The two other flexible mechanisms are joint implementation and the clean de-
velopment mechanism. Joint implementation means emissions-reduction pro-
jects between Annex B countries. The clean development mechanism means 
emission-reduction projects between Annex B and non-Annex B countries, i.e. 
between industrialised and developing countries where the latter did not commit 
themselves to any specific emission ceiling. Overall, the Kyoto agreement, with 
its new focus on the emissions trading system, has attracted considerable inter-
national attention, at the expense of the other two project oriented mechanisms. 
The Kyoto agreement will come into force once it is ratified by at least 55 par-
ties representing at least 55 per cent of the total greenhouse gas emissions of 
Annex B countries in the year 1990. 
 
The first condition, that a minimum of 55 countries become party to the treaty, 
was fulfilled with Iceland’s ratification on 23 May 2002. Now, the main focus 
is on how much is left to meet condition number two: 55 per cent of 1990 CO2 
emissions from the Annex B (industrialised) countries. The score is currently 
                                                           
12  Carbon dioxide (CO2); methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). Also included are three types 
of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), namely: hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs); perfluorocarbons (PFCs) 
and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), EPA (2002). 
 
1743.9 per cent (December 2002) as shown in figure 4. The EU ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol on 31 May 2002 and Japan on 4 June 2002 whereas Australia and the 
United States remain unlikely to join in the near future (CAN, 2002). However, 
ratifications by Russia would be sufficient to reach the 55% emission. 
 

















Source: Cicero (2003). 
4.  The Kyoto protocol and Hot Air 
4.1. The level of Hot Air implied by the Kyoto protocol 
In the case of the Kyoto agreement, GHG emission rights are allocated accord-
ing 1990 levels, i.e., historical emission rights, for most countries. Due the eco-
nomic recession in eastern European countries, the issue of Hot Air has 
emerged as this had led to some of those countries having excess permits. In 
table 1, the level of Hot Air is depicted. 
 
 
18Table 1: GHG emission indicators for Poland, Russia, and Ukraine 
Indicator Poland  Russia  Ukraine 
Reduction commitment in 2008–2012 
compared to baseline year 
8% Reduction  Stabilization  Stabilization
Baseline year  1988  1990  1990 
Baseline year CO2 emissions (MtC)         118    635    182 
1997 CO2 emissions (MtC)           95    422    106 
% Decrease        24%  34%   42% 
Source: Meredydd et al. (2000). 
 
The presence of Hot Air can mean that countries do not have to undertake real 
reductions when actual emissions are already lower than 1990 levels. For ex-
ample, Russia can sell their surplus of permits to the United States, thus reliev-
ing the latter of the responsibility to reduce domestic emissions. Also other 
countries have Hot Air. As reported in Christiansen and Wetterstad (2003) and 
Schleich et al. (2001), German reductions (18.7% CO2 emissions from 1990 to 
1999) have, to a significant degree, been the result of economic restructuring in 
former Eastern Germany since 1990, while British reductions (14% CO2 emis-
sions from 1990 to 1990) have been an unintended outcome of privatization in 
Britain’s energy sector. 
4.2. Will Hot Air secure the environmental targets of the Kyoto protocol 
As shown in section 2, the presence of Hot Air trading does not impede the 
achievement of the defined target levels. The 38 countries that signed the cli-
mate agreement will be given a CO2 quota of permits corresponding to their 
emissions in 1990. In this way, the number of CO2 permits in circulation is 
”frozen” and the CO2 emissions cannot increase further. Then, by 2012 at the 
latest, each individual country will face devaluations of its permit holdings cor-
responding to the target level for that country. 
4.3. Have Hot Air been used as “implicit side payments” 
The United States had strongly advocated the idea of global CO2 trade for two 
main reasons. The first reason is because the tradable permit system worked in 
the United States. Second, the option of buying cheap CO2 permits from East-
ern Europe would create significant gains from trade for both parties. The par-
 
19ticipation of Eastern Europe and thereby the supply of low-price permits was 
secured by the presence of Hot Air. Table 1 showed how Eastern European 
countries would be favored by surplus allocations in the CO2 market. Because, 
for example, Russia and the Ukraine were allowed to stabilize emissions at their 
1990 level, they could readily offer the CO2 reductions created by structural 
changes in their economies. Such Hot Air trade would provide Western Europe 
with cheap permits and Eastern Europe with hard currency. As pointed out by 
Daugbjerg and Svendsen (2001), the United States, Russia and the Ukraine all 
signed the Kyoto Protocol in the belief that Hot Air trading was possible. It was 
the United States that rewarded the Ukraine and Russia with Hot Air during the 
negotiations. By doing that, the United States also created a loophole for acquir-
ing cheap permits for itself. Hence, by facilitating trade in this way, the United 
States has already committed itself to maintaining the possibility of Hot Air 
trading. If Hot Air were to be excluded, the agreement would no longer be a 
credible commitment because countries would no longer gain from participa-
tion. 
 
Although the Hot Air provision appears to be a loophole, had it not been cre-
ated, other Annex B countries would have insisted that their own emission con-
straints should be relaxed. If the use of Hot Air is restricted, the agreement will 
no longer be a true commitment because some countries might no longer re-
ceive net gains from participation. The US position in The Hague negotiations 
mirrors this, since the US claimed the original Kyoto targets were based on the 
presumption of free trade and full and unlimited access to all three flexible 
mechanisms (i.e. permit trading, joint implementation and clean development 
mechanism) in the Protocol. Restricting trade would change the costs of meet-
ing the original targets, and given such cost figures, the US would not have ac-
cepted the original Kyoto targets. The papers by Bohm (1992) and Boom 
(2000) support this argument. The latter shows, in a fairly general model, that it 
is rational for low cost (potential selling) countries to opt for higher emission 
levels and for high cost (potential buying) countries to accept a more stringent 
emission ceiling (compared to the situation without trade) when permit trading 
is feasible. This is explained by the fact that increases in the total trade volume 
imply lower reduction cost for the buying country and higher total payments to 




204.4. How does Hot Air influence costs of meeting the Kyoto Targets? 
Many models have been used to estimate marginal abatement costs, permits 
prices and total abatement costs under different possibilities regarding the flexi-
bilities used to implement the Kyoto targets. We now summarise some of the 
main findings. 
 
First, using flexible mechanisms to implement the Kyoto targets reduces costs 
significantly. Springer and Varilek (2003) report from several different models 
that fully flexible implementation (including Hot Air) of the Kyoto targets, 
permit prices estimate from $3 to $74 per ton. The large variations in the esti-
mation of permit price are caused by differences in business-as-usual emissions 
projections and model design features. The marginal costs of implementing the 
Kyoto Protocol solely by use of domestic measures are reported in Brandt and 
Svendsen (2002) as being from $125 to $250 per ton. In Springer (2002) it is 
reported that several researchers examine the effect of various forms of restric-
tion on emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol. Overall, such restrictions 
lead to diverging marginal costs among Annex B countries and higher total 
abatement costs. 
 
Estimates of the increases in costs given restrictions on trade also exist. In The 
Hague EU promoted national emission ceilings that would require each country 
to implement 50% of its reduction commitment nationally (the so-called sup-
plementarity principle). The main reason for this proposal has been to reduce 
the amount of Hot Air and to promote development of new technology. Esti-
mates of the effect of the EU proposal on overall compliance costs, depending 
on the model and its assumptions, show a cost increase compared with unre-
stricted emissions trading varying from about 20% (e.g. Zhang, 2000) and 50% 
(Gusbin et al., 1999) to even more than 50% (Ybema et al, 1999). Woerdman 
(2001) concludes that the effect of the EU proposal on the permit price is not 
entirely clear since there are restrictions in play both on the supply and the de-
mand side. Most authors seem to agree that the overall result of these restric-
tions is primarily a lower permit price (e.g. Zhang, 2000 and Ybema et al, 
1999). 
 
What are the effects of Hot Air? From Chen (2003) we get some indications of 
the effect of Hot Air on the permit price, analysed as changes in the permit 
 
21price when countries carry all their Hot Air over to subsequent periods, com-
pared to when none is carried over. Two estimates are reported; one shows that 
the permit price increases by 336% from $6.29/tC to $27.46/tC.
13 The other 
shows a more moderate increase in the permit price from of $50.10/tC to 
$56.37C.
14 The large difference in the level of increase is caused by the differ-
ent amount of Hot Air in question. 
 

















After the withdrawal of the largest buyer of emissions permits, the market for 
tradable permits for GHG changes significantly. As reported in Springer (2002), 
in the absence of the US, aggregate permit demand from Annex B countries is 
more or less equal to “Hot Air” from the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. Springer (2002) estimates that permit prices would fall to from $0 to 
$12 per ton CO2. The reason for the fall in the permit price is reproduced in fig-
ure 5. 
 
One way of increasing the permit price would be to restrict the supply of Hot 
Air. However, as clearly indicated by figure 4, following the withdrawal of the 
USA, Russia has gained a high level of negotiating power: If Russia ratifies the 
Protocol, it comes into force, but if Russia does not ratify, the Protocol will not 
come into force. 
                                                           
13  This estimate uses the global trade and environmental model (GTEM) developed by the Austra-
lian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics. The amount of Hot Air in question is re-
ported as 419.9 MtC. 
14  This estimate uses emissions prediction and policy analysis (EPPA), developed by the MIT, 
USA. The amount of Hot Air in question is reported as 85.0 MtC. 
 
224.5. The reduction levels of different scenarios 
Next we identify 4 emissions scenarios under different reduction possibilities, 
which are reported in table 2. Since the amount of Hot Air remains uncertain, 
we report four cases, from a situation with no growth in the CO2 emissions from 
the Hot Air producing counties (low growth scenario) to a high growth scenario 
with an increase in CO2 emissions from these countries of 30% from the base-
line year to 2010. In scenario 1, the Kyoto protocol is implemented with full use 
of flexible mechanisms without any restrictions on Hot Air trading. Here, the 
Hot Air is traded, but it will not affect the overall reduction and the total annex 
B reduction will be 5.2%. If Hot Air trading is not allowed, then the total reduc-
tion is dependent on the CO2 development in the countries that potentially have 
Hot Air. In the extreme event that these countries’ emission stays at their 1997 
level as reported in table 1, then, since these countries emit less than what they 
have the right to do, the total reduction will be increased. In the no-growth case, 
total annex B reductions amount to 13.1% and in a moderate growth scenario 
(10% increase in CO2 in 2010 compared to 1997) the total annex B reduction is 
11.4%. The third scenario considers the case where the largest emitter, the US, 
leaves the Kyoto-agreement and its CO2-emissions are assumed to increase by 
1.3% annually. If all the other countries stick to there reduction obligations, and 
the fully flexible trade situation emerges, then total annex B emissions (includ-
ing the US), increase by 6.2%. The fourth scenario shows that restrictions on 
Hot Air trading reduce this increase, but not enough to reach the original reduc-
tion target. The numbers are reported below in table 2 and in figure 6. 
 
Table 2: Reductions under alternative scenarios 
Growth in CO2-
emissions for Hot Air 
countries compared to 
the 1997 level reported 















Hot Air  
  0%  5.2  13.1  -6.2   1.7 
10% 5.2  11.4  -6.2    0.0 
20%  5.2    9.8  -6.2  -1.6 
30%  5.2    8.2  -6.2  -3.2 
a Calculated using Data from Gusbin et al. (1999): Base line emissions of Annex B: 
3851MtC, 5.2% reduction yields 3650.7MtC, in the 10% amount of Hot Air case, 
which equals 240.26MtC, emissions under Kyoto are 3410.5 compared to 3851 MtC 
yielding an “effective reduction” of 11.4%. 
 
23b Calculated using data from Barrett (1998a) and by assuming that the US increases 
emissions by 32% from 1990 to 2010 (Brandt and Svendsen, 2002). 
 
The development in the 4 scenarios is also shown in figure 6. Which scenario is 
the most likely? Without the US, Russia has received tremendous bargaining 
power, which can be seen from figure 4. So the likely scenario is that a fully 
flexible trade system will be introduced, ironically without the US. Hence, sce-
nario 3 could well come around, which implies a 6.2% increase in emissions of 
all Annex B countries (including the USA). If so, then the worst scenario in 
terms of emissions reduction will result, i.e. the situation where relatively low 
marginal costs will not yield high incentives for R&D. But, will increase emis-
sions thus having serious long run implications. 
 
Figure 6: Scenarios showing the development in reduction in emissions in 
percentages compared to 1990 emissions levels (10% scenario from 
table 2) 
 
Emissions Annex B  Business-as-usual 
Kyoto+Hot air+USA
Kyoto- Hot air-USA 













245.   Are past performances linked to future develop-
ments in the climate change negotiations? 
According to Barrett (1998b), a stage in the negotiation process can be split into 
5 phases, a pre-negotiation phase, the actual negotiation, ratification, implemen-
tation, and finally, re-negotiation. Moreover, as already noted, in many interna-
tional environmental agreements a distinct feature that can be identified is that 
progress is achieved stepwise by successive rounds of negotiations, where fu-
ture demands are positively related to past performance. 
 
When a major contributor in the process leaves the agreement, one of two 
things is likely to emerge: either the total reduction target will not be achieved, 
or there will be a re-negotiation resulting in a less ambitious overall target to 
include the country again.
15 
 
The successive build up is especially true for the negotiations over the climate 
change issue. Here the first negotiations in Rio in 1992 stipulated stabilization 
of emissions, whereas the Kyoto agreement stipulated a total 5.2% reduction by 
2008-2012 compared to 1990 levels for most industrialized countries. A second 
round is expected to follow the Kyoto-agreement after 2012, where even more 
stringent reduction levels are to be expected. Moreover, Future demands are 
linked to positive performance in the Kyoto-negotiations. This has e.g. been 
identified by Barrett (1998a), who notes that in a second round that is expected 
to follow the Kyoto-agreement, a country might be able to negotiate an easier 
target for the next period if it invested less in reducing its abatement costs in the 
first control period. 
 
Considering all the evidence above, it might not be unreasonable to assume that 
once the negotiations break down, in any of the stages, the process has to start 
all over again and there will be a time-delay in the whole process. Such a situa-
tion is reproduced in figure 7.
16 The idea of this figure is that at any time there 
is an upper level of feasible achievements (regarding the level of total reduction 
possibilities), determined, on the one side, by the political and economic situa-
                                                           
15  Of course, the remaining countries could agree to reduce more by themselves, but this would 
make them worse off, and the free riding country better off. 
16  It is obvious that this is only a heuristic picture, but we think it contains much sound common 
sense. 
 
25tion, and on the other hand by physiological factors such as the present level of 
trust (in order to overcome the prisoners dilemma-like situation) between the 
affected countries. Once the total achievement exceeds the maximum level of 
achievements, then there will be a high risk of breakdown, which results in a 
delay until new negotiations take place. Once a new agreement is re-negotiated, 
the new upper level of feasible achievements is now at a lower level. The rea-
son for this can be twofold; either because the level of trust has been dimin-
ished, or because simply because it takes time before the process can be re-
started. 
 





The Hague (2000) 
Kyoto (1997) with 
hot air trading 
Total level of  
achievements 
Maximum of achievements 
New lower maximum achievement 
Kyoto (1997) without
Hot air trading 
 
As argued in Brandt and Svendsen (2002), the main reason for the collapse of 
the negotiations at The Hague were the increased costs of implementing the 
Kyoto Protocol, compared to the expectations that built the foundation for the 
Kyoto Protocol due to the restrictions on trade. As seen from table 2, such re-
strictions would have resulted in much higher reductions than in the original 
Kyoto protocol, due to restrictions on Hot Air trading. This is indicated in fig-
ure 1 by letting the reduction levels of the Kyoto Protocol be above what is sus-
tainable politically. Instead of the high reduction scenario 1 from table 1, the 
climate change issue is likely to end in scenario 3, which contains less reduction 
than the original Kyoto protocol would have resulted in, in accordance with the 
picture in figure 7. 
 
266.  Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to analyze whether the presence of Hot Air trad-
ing did jeopardize the environmental target of an international environmental 
agreement. We discussed the option of using Hot Air as an implicit side-
payment mechanism which may actually bring about higher environmental pro-
tection compared to the situation without the trade option. Demonstrating how a 
fundamental trade-off exists between costs of compliance and the creation of 
dynamic incentives to develop cheaper reduction technologies, we argued that 
implicit side-payments, in terms of Hot Air provision, were needed in order to 
establish a compromise between these opposing demands. In this way, we iden-
tify the shortcomings and benefits of allowing fully flexible permit trading in-
cluding grandfathering of permits. 
 
The main conclusion is that pushing forward too ambitious reduction targets, 
(compared to the costs of meeting these targets), has pushed down the future 
possibilities of implementing increased reduction targets. Moreover, the argu-
ment that a high level of domestic reductions can encourage development of 
environmentally friendly reduction technologies fails to include the fact that 
such a strategy increases the risk of making the negotiations too costly. This 
results in less severe reduction obligations in the future, making this strategy 
less environmentally friendly than accepting that the low cost option, in some 
cases (e.g. in the climate change issue), are the main cause of success. 
 
The main lesson from our analysis is that one has to consider the effect of short 
run policies on long run feasible achievements: If a dead-lock is the result of 
too low political acceptability, then the long run incentives will also be eroded, 
but the contrary is not true. In the case where progress to alleviate the interna-
tionally dispersed pollutant take place in a step by step manner and where fu-
ture reduction requirements are linked to past performances, is it possible to 
identify situations where high short run political acceptability is a pre-requisite 
for the long run incentives to be achievable. 
 
Regarding the Kyoto-agreement, we show that a very likely implication is that 
the EU proposal of restricting trade paradoxically may lead to lower permit 
prices than would have occurred if all actors had full free trade access in the 
first place. With the US withdrawal from the Kyoto protocol, two main effects 
 
27occurred in the market. First, Russia gained a large negotiating power and now 
has the power to demand full access to Hot Air trading. Second, since the larg-
est buying country has left the negotiations, a decrease in the permit price can 
be expected. If the motivation for the proposed restriction on free trade was to 
encouraging research and development, this strategy has clearly failed, jeopard-
izing the Kyoto target level. 
 
The development in the climate change negotiations after the Kyoto agreement 
shows that because the treaty implies costly action, the prospect of its success 
depends crucially on the ability to reach the stipulated targets at minimum 
costs. In this way, our main contribution is to argue that the conflict between 
the EU and the United States stems mainly from disagreement over the cost is-
sue. If the cost implications following the EU proposal are ignored, the possibil-
ity of a total breakdown in future negotiations is severely increased and this will 
hamper joint efforts to improve the global environment. 
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